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ALctions on the Basis of Race Are Impermissible
Under Title VII Unless the Employer Can Show a
Strong Basis In Evidence that if Action Was Not
Taken, the Employer Would Be Held Liable Under
the Disparate -Impact Statute: Ricci v. DeStefano
CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII-DISPARATE-IMPACT-DISPARATE-
TREATMENT-The United States Supreme Court held that race
based actions that would otherwise amount to disparate treatment
discrimination are impermissible under Title V11, unless the em-
ployer can demonstrate a strong-basis-in-evidence that, if the em-
ployer did not take the action, liability would arise under the dis-
parate-impact statute. The Appellees did not demonstrate that
liability would likely arise and therefore, the Appellees violated
Title VII.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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1. THE FACTS OF Ricci
Like most emergency personnel services in the United States,
the New Haven, Connecticut fire department relied on objective
examinations as a means for determining promotions through the
ranks of its department.' In 2003, the department administered
examinations to 118 firefighters to determine who would qualify
for promotion to the coveted positions of lieutenant and captain. 2
Because promotions were infrequent and the examinations deter-
mined when and to whom promotions would be given, many New
Haven firefighters invested considerable time and money in pre-
paring for the examinations. 3
The results of the examinations revealed that white test-takers
had scored higher than minority test-takers. 4 This disparity
sparked a debate between firefighters who thought the test was
balanced and fair and firefighters who thought the test was racial-
ly discriminatory. 5 The City of New Haven decided to discard the
test results, prompting several white and Hispanic firefighters,
who would have been promoted on the basis of the examination, to
file Suit. 6
New Haven did not administer or create the exam; instead it
hired a consulting firm, Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc.
(ISO), to do So. 7 ISO created the examination for the New Haven
Fire Department by analyzing the skills necessary to be a captain
or lieutenant in the department. 8 It did this by interviewing and
observing higher-ranked officers. 9 Additionally, ISO gathered in-
formation from minority firefighters to prevent the examination
from favoring non-minority test-takers. 10 It also gave test-takers
information about how and what to study prior to taking the ex-
am."1
1 . Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).





7. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665. ISO specializes in creating promotional examinations for
police and fire departments. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2664.
11. Id. at 2666.
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The examination consisted of one hundred multiple-choice ques-
tions and an oral section.12 For the eight vacancies for the position
of lieutenant, seventy-seven candidates took the exam. 13 For the
seven vacancies for the position of captain, forty-one candidates
took the exam. 14
After receiving the exam results, the New Haven Civil Service
Board (CSB) held five meetings to determine whether the scores
should be certified or if they should be discarded on the basis of
allegations that the exam questions were not fair to minority test-
takers. 15 Though the vote was very close, the CSB ultimately de-
cided that the scores would not be certified.16
The seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter
who passed the exam filed suit against the City of New Haven,
Mayor John DeStefano, Chief Administrative Officer Karen Du-
Bois-Walton, City Counsel Thomas Ude, Department of Human
Resources Director Tina Burgett, the two members of the CSB
who voted that the exams be discarded, and Reverend Boise
Kimber, a resident and political leader of New Haven who strong-
ly opposed the test results being counted. 17
The plaintiffs alleged that New Haven violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196418 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment19 by discriminatorily discarding the exam
results of white and Hispanic firefighters. 20 New Haven countered
12. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2666. There were thirty superior-ranking officers who were
picked to assess the examinations. Id. These assessors were intensively trained to score
the exams. Id.
13. Id. The racial breakdown of the lieutenant candidates consisted of forty-three
whites, nineteen blacks, and fifteen Hispanics. Id. Thirty-four of the seventy-seven candi-
dates passed the exam and their racial breakdown consisted of twenty-five whites, six
blacks, and three Hispanics. Id. The top ten test scores were all eligible for immediate
promotion and all ten where white. Id. Vacancies that occurred later, would allow for the
three black candidates to be eligible for promotion into the lieutenant position. Id.
14. Id. The racial breakdown of the captain candidates consisted of twenty-four whites,
eight blacks, and eight Hispanics. Id. Twenty-two of the forty-one passed and their racial
breakdown consisted of sixteen whites, three blacks, and three Hispanics. Id. The top nine
scores were eligible for immediate promotion. Id. Their racial breakdown consisted of
seven whites and three Hispanics. Id.
15. Id. at 2667. At these meetings firefighters voiced their positions on whether the
exam scores should be used or thrown out, prior to actually knowing who passed the exam
and who did not. Id. Witnesses and experts also spoke in front of the CSB about the test
scores. Id.
16. Id. at 2671.
17. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
19. Although the Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided this case solely on the basis of the Title VII
claim. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2664-65.
20. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671.
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that if it did not discard the exam results, it could be liable under
Title VII for engaging in a business practice that would have a
disparate-impact on minority firefighters. 21
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Ricci
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of New
Haven.22 The court concluded that New Haven's actions did not
constitute racial discrimination because all of the candidates took
the same exam with the same result-the exams were discarded
and no one was promoted.23 The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision and adopted its rationale.24 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.25
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN Ricci
The issue that the Court resolved was whether New Haven and
the named officials discriminated against the white and Hispanic
firefighters who scored higher than other minority firefighters by
discarding the exam results, and if so whether this violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Second Circuit and held that New Haven's ac-
tion in discarding the exam results violated Title VII.2 7
21. Id. at 2673. The Court summarized the disparate -impact provision of Title VII as
follows: "Under the disparate -impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation
by showing that an employer uses 'a particular employment practice that causes a dispa-
rate-impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). The Court further indicated the defense an employer can use:
An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Even if
the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing
that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that
has less disparate-impact and serves the employer's legitimate needs.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C)). The Court defined disparate -impact as
"1practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately ad-
verse effect on minorities." Id. at 2658.
22. Id. at 2671. The district court reasoned that the respondents' "motivation to avoid
making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate -impact ... does not, as a mat-
ter of law, constitute discriminatory intent." Id.
23. Id. at 2672.
24. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672.
25. Id.
26. Id. The issue is framed without the inclusion of the Equal Protection allegation
because the Court was able to decide this case on the basis of the Title V11 issue. For this
reason, the Court did not make a determination on the constitutional issue. Id at 2675.
27. Id. at 2672.
Summer 2010Ricci v. DeStefano67
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
The Court began its analysis by asserting that New Haven's ac-
tion of discarding the results of the firefighter's exam violated
Title VII because the evidence indicated that New Haven's action
was based upon race, i.e., New Haven made its decision based
upon the statistical disparity in scores between white test-takers
and minority test-takers.28 As such, Justice Kennedy, who wrote
for the majority, stated that New Haven could avoid liability only
by showing justification for this disparate treatment.29 The Court
then analyzed whether trying to avoid liability on the basis of dis-
parate-impact constituted such a justification. 3 0 To do this, the
Court determined that it had to establish an evidentiary standard
by which to judge these types of cases.31
The majority opinion relied upon Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,32 which announced the strong-basis-in-evidence stan-
dard.33 The strong-basis-in-evidence standard is a higher stan-
dard of evidence than the prima facie standard, and requires more
than just a mathematical basis of discrimination. 3 4 The Court in
Ricci reasoned that applying this evidentiary standard to Title VII
would allow violations of either the disparate -treatment or dispa-
rate-impact provisions in only certain limited cases.35 Moreover,
the Court determined that this standard gives the employer suita-
ble discretion that will be limited to cases where there is a strong-
basis-in-evidence of disparate-impact liability, but not so limited
that employers may only act when there is an actual violation of
Title VII.36
28. Id. at 2673.
29. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
33. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675. Justice Kennedy referred to the significance of the majori-
ty opinion in Wygant: "Justice Powell recognized the tension between eliminating segrega-
tion and discrimination on the one hand and doing away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race on the other." Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)). The majority in Wygant also explained why there is a re-
quired strong-basis-in-evidence: "Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial
action is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is challenged in court by
nonminority employees." Wygant, 476 S. Ct. at 277.
34. The strong-basis-in-evidence standard is defined as "requir[ing] more than merely a
prima facie demonstration of numerical imbalance, which may exist as a result of societal
factors without any discrimination by the government." Petitioners' Reply Brief on the
Merits at 11, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328).
35. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
36. Id.
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The majority reasoned that by applying this standard, the dis-
parate-impact provision would be consistent with other sections of
Title V11, specifically § 2000e-2(l)Y 7 Section 2000e-2Q) addresses
the unlawful use of test scores that are discriminatory by prohibit-
ing any employment practice that utilizes examinations as a
means of hiring and/or promotion, and then alters the results of
the examination on a discriminatory basis. 38
Justice Kennedy asserted that promotional examinations like
the one given to the New Haven firefighters are important in ob-
jectively selecting candidates that have proven their qualifications
by their test score. 39  Because there was no strong-basis-in-
evidence that the promotional exam was ineffective or that New
Haven had to discard the scores to avoid liability on the basis of
disparate-impact, the Court reasoned that New Haven acted un-
lawfully.40
Based upon this rationale, the Court adopted the strong-basis-
in-evidence standard established in Wygant. Justice Kennedy fur-
ther clarified that under Title VII, an employer must have a
strong-basis-in-evidence that the employer. will be liable under
disparate-impact before the employer can engage in intentional
discrimination to avoid unintentional disparate -impact. 4 1
New Haven argued that even under this strong-basis-in-
evidence standard, its action of discarding the exam scores was
justifiable because of its fear of disparate -impact liability.4 2 This
argument notwithstanding, Justice Kennedy and the majority of
the Court found that there was no evidence on the record to sup-
port this conclusion. 43 The majority concluded that New Haven
37. Id.
38. Section 2000e-2(l) provides:
Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection
with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or
promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise
alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20).
39. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676. Justice Kennedy stated that "[e[mployment tests can be
an important part of a neutral selection system that safeguards against the very racial
animosities Title VII was intended to prevent." Id.
40. Id. The majority found that "[riestricting an employer's ability to discard test re-
sults (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their race) also
is in keeping with Title \TII's express protection of bona fide promotional examinations." Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
41. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
42. Id. at 2677.
43. Id. at 2677. The Court stated:
Vol. 48678
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failed to show that there was "no genuine issue as to any material
fact" and that they were "entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.""4 The majority opined that New Haven could only provide
evidence of disparate -impact liability by showing a significant sta-
tistical disparity between white test-takers and minority test-
takers.45 The Court held that this statistical disparity alone did
not meet the strong-basis-in-evidence standard and that New Ha-
ven would have been liable for disparate -impact. 4 6 To show dispa-
rate-impact, the Court stated, the examinations should have been
unrelated to work and a business necessity or there must have
been an alternative exam that was less discriminatory that New
Haven could have adopted but chose not to.47 Justice Kennedy
next addressed these points and analyzed why there was no
strong-basis-in-evidence that the exam was defective in either as-
pect.48
The Court determined that since there was no dispute that the
exams were work-related and a business necessity, it should base
its analysis on the issue of whether there was a strong-basis-in-
evidence of a similar, less discriminatory exam that New Haven
could have adopted and did not.49 The respondents raised three
arguments in support of their position that there was evidence of
an alternative test, none of which the Court found compelling. SO
The respondents first argued that if had they weighted the writ-
ten and oral sections of the exam differently, New Haven then
could have considered two black candidates for the lieutenant po-
Even if respondents were motivated as a subjective matter by a desire to avoid com-
mitting disparate -impact discrimination, the record makes clear that there is no sup-
port for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in evidence to
find the tests inadcquate, with some consequent disparate -impact liability in viola-
tion of Title VII.
Id.
44. Id. Justice Kennedy explained what must be proved to grant a motion for summary
judgment in this case: "The petitioners must demonstrate that there can be no genuine
dispute that there was no strong basis in evidence for the City to conclude it would face
disparate-impact liability it is certified the examination results." Id.
45. Id.
46. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
47. Id. at 2678. Justice Kennedy determined that "[petitioners] could be liable for
disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related and consis-
tent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less -discrim in atory alter-
native that served the City's needs but that the City refused to adopt." Id.
48. Id. at 2679.
49. Id. at 2679-80.
50. Id. at 2679.
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sition and one black candidate for the captain position. 51 The ma-
jority countered the respondents' argument by reasoning that
there was no evidence to prove that weighing the test scores diffe-
rently would assess the skills necessary for the job in the same
way New Haven originally weighed the scores. 52 Moreover, the
Court found that changing the weight of the exam could also have
violated Title VII, which prohibits the changing of test scores on
the basis of race. 53
The respondents next argued that a different understanding of
the "Rule of Three" would have produced less discriminatory re-
suits than New Haven's understanding of it. 54 The respondents
suggested that the use of banding the scores would have allowed
four black and one Hispanic candidate to be eligible to fill either
the lieutenant or captain positions. 55 The Court, however, found
that banding is not an equal and valid alternative to scoring the
tests because if New Haven scored the tests and then imple-
mented the use of banding to raise the scores of minority test tak-
ers, it would have violated Title VII. 56
Finally, the respondents argued that Chris Hornick, an indus-
trial/organizational psychologist, made statements that in his opi-
nion there could have been less of a disparity in the test results
had an "assessment center" evaluated the candidates. 57 The Court
however, pointed to other remarks that Hornick made in support
of certifying the test results to show that the respondents' reliance
on his assessment was weak.58
51. Ricci, 129 S. ct. at 2679. New Haven used a 60/40 (written to oral) weighting as
required by its contract with the New Haven Firefighter's Union. Id. Respondents sug-
gested changing the scores to a 30/70 weighing. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 42 U.s.c § 2000e-2Q)).
54. Id. at 2679.80. The Court explained the "Rule of Three" as "[tihe rule, in the New
Haven city charter, [which] requires the City to promote only from 'those applicants with
the three highest scores' on a promotional examination." Id.
55. Id. at 2680. The majority defined "banding' as "[tihe City's previous practice of
rounding scores to the nearest whole number and considering all candidates with the same
whole-number score as being of one rank." Id.
56. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2680. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2Q).
57. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2680. Justice Kennedy explained the witness's testimony to the
CSB:
At the next meeting, on March 11, the CSB heard from three witnesses it had se-
lected to 'tell us a little hit about their views of the testing, the process, [and] the me-
thodology!' . . . Hornick is an industrial/organizational psychologist from Texas who
operates a consulting business that 'directfly]' competes with lOS.
Id.
58. Id. Justice Kennedy continued to explain the respondents' reliance upon Mr. Hor-
nick: "Hornick stated that adverse impact in standardized testing 'has been in existence
since the beginning of test' and that the disparity in New Haven's test results was 'some-
680 Vol. 48
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The Court found that there was not a strong-basis-in-evidence
that the exams were defective because they were not job-related or
because other similar and less discriminatory ways to test the
candidates' abilities were available to New Haven.59 The majority
determined that its holding in this case demonstrated how Title
VII should be applied to solve issues regarding disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.60
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia joined in the Court's opinion but wrote a separate
concurring opinion to assert that this decision was just postponing
another question that the Court would eventually have to re-
solve-whether the Title VII's disparate impact provisions violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.61 Justice
Scalia further opined that Title VII effectively conflicts with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth because at times it re-
quires employers to make race-based or race related decisions. 62
Justice Scalia also stated that because Title VII allows for em-
ployers to evaluate the racial implications of their policies and
make determinations accordingly, Title VII is not protecting
against discrimination but instead allowing for further intentional
discrimination, just one step removed.63 Although Justice Scalia
asserted that generally the disparate -impact provisions of Title
VII are too broad, he emphasized that the provisions would be bet-
ter utilized as a means of determining when employers intention-
ally discriminate, because disparate -impact can be a "signal" that
there are discriminatory actions taking place.64
what higher hut generally in the range that we've [Hornick's company] seen professional-
ly."' Id.
59. Id. at 2681.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that "[a]s the facts
of these cases illustrate, Title VII's disparate -impact provisions place a racial thumb on the
scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and it
makes decisions based on those racial outcomes." Id.
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C. Justice Alito's Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
joined, also wrote a concurring opinion.65 Justice Alito asserted
that he wrote a separate opinion only because he believed the dis-
sent had omitted important facts, which lead them to reach the
incorrect conclusion in this case.66 Additionally, Justice Auito's
opinion contended that two questions had to be determined to re-
solve this case, one objective and one subjective.67 According to
Justice Alito, the objective question to be answered when an em-
ployer is subject to a disparate -treatment case is whether the em-
ployer has a legitimate reason to make the decision that resulted
in disparate-treatment. 68 Likewise, the subjective question that
Justice Alito thought determinative was the intent of the employ-
er, that is, whether the reason provided by the employer is an
excuse for actual discriminatory action.69
Justice Auito also pointed out that the disagreement between
the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion pertained to the
objective question, that is, the justification given by the employer
as to whether its actions would have created a basis of liability for
disparate-impact. 70 He went on to illustrate his view of the facts
regarding the New Haven administration's discarding of the test
scores. 71 Justice Alito asserted that the evidence indicated that
New Haven's reason for not certifying the test scores had nothing
to do with a violation of the disparate -impact provisions of Title
65. Id. at 2683. (Alito, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Ricci, 129 S. ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., concurring)
68. Id. Justice Alito explained the questions that he believed to be at issue in this case:
The first, objective question is whether the reason given by the employer is one that
is legitimate under Title V11. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
If the reason provided by the employer is not legitimate on its face, the employer is
liable. The second, subjective question concerns the employer's intent. If an employer
offers a facially legitimate reason for its decision but it turns out that this explan a-
tion was just a pretext for discrimination, the employer is again liable.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2684.
7 1. Id.
72. Ricci, 129 S. ct. at 2684-85 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito explained his asser-
tion:
Almost as soon as the City disclosed the racial makeup of the list of firefighters who
scored the highest on the exam, the City administration was lobbied by an influential
community leader to scrap the test results, and the City administration decided on
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VII, but rather was the result of appeasing a prominent minority
leader in the community, Reverend Boise Kimber, who had politi-
cal power and lobbied the CSB. 72 Moreover, Justice Alito asserted
that the dissent's argument could not be adopted because it would
decide an issue of Title VII that the Court had yet to resolve.73
That issue was whether and to the extent that an employer can be
held liable under Title VII when his subordinates have the intent
to discriminate and may have influence over the employer in his
making of the decision but do not actually make the decision.74
D. Justice Ginsberg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Breyer joined, wrote the dissent. 75 The dissent argued
that the majority opinion failed to acknowledge the evidence of
numerous flaws with the examination and that better examina-
tions have been used in other cities without the same racially dis-
proportionate result.7 6 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg believed that
in reaching its decision the majority opinion failed to properly ap-
ply the benchmark decision of Griggs.77 Justice Ginsberg asserted
that the majority failed to apply the explanation rendered by the
Court in Griggs, which she stated, explained the enforcement of
Title VII, which is centerecf on the concept of disparate -impact. 7 8
The dissent further disagreed with the majority's application of
the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, stating that it makes vo-
luntary adherence to the disparate -impact provision of Title VII
difficult. 79 Justice Ginsburg provided two arguments in support
of her opinion that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard is "un-
impressive."80 First, the dissent argued that the majority's ratio-
nale for the heightened standard is counter-intuitive. 81 Justice
73. Id. at 2688.
74. Id. Justice Alito explained: "Adoption of the dissent's argument would implicitly
decide an important question of Title VII law that this Court has never resolved-the cir-
cumstances in which an employer may be held liable based on the discriminatory intent of
subordinate employees who influence but do not make the ultimate employment decision."
Id.
75. Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2690.
77. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Referring to the decision of
Griggs, Justice Ginsburg added that the case "explained the centrality of the disparate-
impact concept to effective enforcement of Title VII." Id.
78. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
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Ginsburg argued that the majority justified the standard because,
without it, an employee's legitimate expectation as to what result
would occur after taking the exam would not be fulfilled. 82 Justice
Ginsburg argued that an employee's expectation is dependent
upon the authority of the exam itself.8 3 Second, the dissent ar-
gued that the majority placed too much emphasis on the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard by stating that without this standard
an employer could potentially create a quota situation, in which
the employer could tip the balance of the test results in favor of a
more racially auspicious result. 8 4 The dissent favored instead a
reasonableness standard that would require an employer to show
good cause in evidence.85
The dissent further argued that the majority should have re-
manded the case for further proceedings to allow the respondents
to meet the strong-basis-in-evidence standard.86
By applying what the dissent believed to be the correct stan-
dard, Justice Ginsburg would have held that the respondents had
cause to believe that they would be liable under the disparate-
impact provision of Title V1.87 That is, the respondents could
show that their promotion process was defective and it was not
justified by a business necessity. 88 The dissent reasoned that be-
cause of the racial disparity in the results, the CSB had cause to
further evaluate the City's promotional process of the examina-
tion. After further evaluation, the dissent argued that the CSB
would have found that the City did not consider other alternative
methods of the process. 89 The dissent also argued that there are
inherent problems with the method of written test taking for this
specific job and that the weighting of the exam was not sufficiently
and deliberately thought out; rather, it was merely an arrange-
82. Ricci, 129 S. ct. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The dissent explained its reasoning: "The employer must have good cause to
believe that the method screens out qualified applicants and would be difficult to justify as
grounded in business necessity." Id.
86. Id. at 2703. "~When this Court formulates a new legal rule, the ordinary course is to
remand and allow the lower courts to apply the rule in the first instance." Id. (citing John-
son v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Pull man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)).
87. Ricci, 129 S. ct. at 2703 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Id. "The pass rate for minority candidates was half the rate for nonminority candi-
dates, and virtually no minority candidates would have been eligible for promotion had the
exam results been certified." Id.
89. Id.
Vol. 48684
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ment between New Haven and the firefighter's union.90 Moreover,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that New Haven failed to look into oth-
er available alternatives to the exam process, further justifying its
fear of disparate-impact liability.9'
At the conclusion of the dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg re-
sponded to Justice Alito's concurring opinion, which alleged that
the decision not to certify the test results had more to do with sa-
tisfying a popular political figure in New Haven (Reverend Boise
Kimber) and less to do with the CSB's actual decision.92 Justice
Ginsburg responded by attempting to debunk Justice Alito's alle-
gations and asserted that the concurring opinion placed too much
emphasis on Reverend Kimber's role in the decision making
process.93
In the very last sentences of Justice Ginsburg's dissent, she dis-
cussed her opinion that the majority's decision was regrettable
and that the majority's rationale was inconsistent with the Court's
ruling in Griggs.94 In sum, dissent asserted that a race-based vi-
olation of Title VII did not exist in this case.95
IV. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND) PRECEDENT LEADING
TO RICCI
A. Disparate Treatment Liability
In July of 1965, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act went into effect
to forbid the disparate treatment of employees. 96 Title VII man-
90. Id. at 2704. Justice Ginsburg explained the problem with written tests for fire-
fighters: "Relying heavily on written tests to select fire officers is a questionable practice,
to say the least. Successful fire officers, the City's description of the position makes clear,
must have the '[albility to lead personnel effectively, maintain discipline, promote harmo-
ny, exercise sound judgment, and cooperate with other officials."' Id.
91. Id. at 2706
92. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2709. Justice Ginsburg asserted her further disagreement with Justice Ali-
to's concurring opinion: "In any event, Justice Alito's analysis contains a more fundamen-
tal flaw: It equates political considerations with unlawful discrimination." Id.
94. Id. at 2710. The dissent finally asserted their difference of opinion:
It is indeed regrettable that the City's noncertification decision would have required
all candidates to go through another selection process. But it would have been more
regrettable to rely on flawed exams to shut out candidates who may well have the
command presence and other qualities needed to excel as fire officers. Yet that is the
choice the Court makes today. It is a choice that breaks the promise of Griggs that
groups long denied equal opportunity would not be held back by tests "fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation."
Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. 424).
95. Id. at 2710.
96. Id. at 2696.
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dated that employers could not intentionally treat an individual
employee differently on the basis of race. 97 The disparate treat-
ment provisions of Title VII held employers liable if they refused
to hire, terminated, or discriminated against any employee or po-
tential employee on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.98 Moreover, disparate treatment provisions of
Title VII also held employers liable if they took actions that ad-
versely effected an individual's employment on the basis of his
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.99 Both of these provi-
sions of Title VII must also be linked to the employer's intent to
discriminate against an employee on the basis of race in order for
that employer to be held liable for disparate treatment liability. 00
In response to The Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically, Title
VII, employers in general had to abolish any type of rules, practic-
es or procedures that would prevent minorities from obtaining
employment that was typically reserved for whites. 101 It was not
until the Griggs decision, however, that Title VII was interpreted
to cover both disparate treatment liability and disparate impact.
B. The Evolution of the Disparate-Impact Proof Structure
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not explicitly prohibit dispa-
rate-impact discrimination. 0 2 Nevertheless, in 1971, the Court in
the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., construed Title
VII to prohibit not only disparate treatment discrimination, 10 3 but
also business practices that may be facially non -discriminatory
but have an adverse impact or disparate -impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.104
Pursuant to Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,105 and prior to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the plaintiff had the
burden of persuasion at all times. The burden of production, how-
ever, shifted to the Defendant employer once the plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case, at which time, the Defendant employer
97. Id.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2G), (2).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2119-20 (1989).
103. Disparate-Treatment is defined as, "[tihe practice, esp. in employment, of intentionally
dealing with persons differently because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disabili-
ty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (9th ed. 2009).
104. 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 239 (2009).
105. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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had to produce evidence of a business necessity in a disparate-
impact situation. 106 Once the employer made this showing, the
plaintiff had the burden to persuade the trier of fact that the prac-
tice at issue was not a business necessity, and that there existed
an equally effective non- discriminatory practice. 07
With the enactment of The Civil Rights Act of 1991, the proof
structure of disparate -impact cases changed due to Congress
amending Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified dispa-
rate-impact by asserting that a plaintiff must show that there ex-
isted prima facie evidence by establishing that his employer used
an employment practice that caused a disparate-impact on the
basis of race.' 08 Plaintiffs employer in the alternative may de-
fend, by showing that the alleged employment practice is job re-
lated and is a business necessity. 109 Additionally, if the plaintiff
could show that there existed a valid alternative employment
practice that was not discriminatory and the employer refused to
adopt that alternative, disparate -impact liability under Title VII
existed.110 In employment determinations, the use of an examina-
tion can provide the potential for disparate -impact results."1 '
C. Disparate Impact Liability
The Court in Griggs was the first to apply the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to the issue of whether an employer may use an employ-
ment exam to determine job placement and promotions."12 In
Griggs, a group of black employees filed suit against Duke Power
Company for requiring a high school education or passing a gen-
eral intelligence test as a condition of achieving employment or
being promoted."13 The evidence revealed that employees at Duke
Power Company, who had neither completed high school nor taken
the intelligence test, still performed their jobs at a competent lev-
el."14 The Court inferred that the implementation of these new
106. Id. at 2121.
107. Id. at 2122.
108. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 48 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 75 (2009).
112. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425.
113. Id. at 426.
114. Id. at 431. "The promotion record of present employees who would not be able to
meet the new criteria thus suggests the possibility that the requirements may not he
needed even for the limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of advancement within
the Company." Id. at 432.
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requirements for job promotion were not a business necessity. 115
The Griggs court analyzed the legislative intent of Congress in
passing the Civil Rights Act and determined that the Act prohibits
not just overt discrimination but also employment practices that
are discriminatory in operation."16 Moreover, the Griggs court
found that the "touchstone" of the Act was the business necessity
aspect.' 17 The business necessity aspect is proven when the em-
ployment practice is shown to exclude a group of people on the
basis of race, the employer cannot show that it is related to busi-
ness necessity, and the practice is prohibited."18
By applying Title VII and the Court's interpretation of it, Chief
Justice Burger and the majority determined that the company,
who wanted to use exams for employment promotion, failed to ful-
fill the requirement of a business need."19 The Court concluded
that under the provisions of Title VII, the employer could not re-
quire a high school education or certain tests as a condition for
employment or promotion when the conditions were not a business
necessity. 20 Additionally, these conditions made it more difficult
for black employees to be qualified at a substantially higher rate
than white employees.' 2 '
In 1975, the Court again analyzed the Civil Rights Act in the
case Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.'22 In Albemarle, black em-
ployees filed suit against their employer, alleging that certain em-
ployment policies, practices, customs, or usages violated of the
115. Id.
116. Id. at 429-30. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 43 1.
117. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
118. Id. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
119. Id. at 432.
120. Id. at 436. The Court stated:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously
they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechan-
isms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job per-
formance. Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the
better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifi-
cations the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex became irre-
levant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the per-
son for the job and no the person in the abstract.
Id.
12 1. Id.
122. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Civil Rights Act.123 The issue before the Court in Albermarle was
the standard of proof that an employer must establish to show
that employment examinations were discriminatory on the basis
of race in effect, but not intentionally, and how they were a busi-
ness necessity. 124
In Ricci, the Court clarified that it was the employer's burden to
provide evidence that showed that its practice had an important
connection to the employment, thereby proving the business ne-
cessity requirement established in Griggs.125 The Albermarle
Court established that employees must provide evidence that the
employer could have reasonably implemented a valid and equal
alternative to the discriminatory employment practice and did
not.126 The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings, in
which the district court was to look to the newly established guide-
lines the Supreme Court had established. 2 7
In a similar 1982 case, Connecticut v. Teal, the Court again ap-
plied Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 128 In Teal, black employees
alleged that a promotional written examination required by their
employers, a state agency, was discriminatory on the basis of
race. 129 The issue before the Court was whether an employer may
offer a "bottom-line" form of defense when an employer is sued
under Title VII.1 3 0 The Court reasoned that a statistical disparity
alone does not justify an employment action that created a dispa-
123. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 408-09.
124. Id. at 413.
125. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
126. Id. Justice Stewart, on behalf of the majority in Albermarle, established that:
The appropriate standard of proof for job relatedness has not been clarified until to-
day. Similarly, the respondents have not until today been specifically apprised of
their opportunity to present evidence that even validated tests might be a "pretext"
for discrimination in light of alternative selection procedures available to the Com-
pany. We also note that the Guidelines authorize provisional use of tests, pending
new validation efforts, in certain very limited circumstances.
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 436.
127. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 436.
128. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
129. Teal, 457 U.S. at 442-43.
130. Id. at 442. Justice Brennan on behalf of the majority defined the "bottom-line"
defense as follows:
Under that theory, as asserted in this case, an employer's acts of racial discrimina-
tion in promotions-effected by an examination having disparate impact-would not
render the employer liable for the racial discrimination suffered by employees barred
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rate-impact. 131 Moreover, Justice Brennan asserted that a non-
discriminatory "bottom-line" and an employer's efforts to create a
racially balanced staff does not justify intentional acts of discrimi-
nation on the basis of race. 132 The Court held that this "bottom-
line" approach does not stop employees from asserting a prima
facie case of disparate-impact liability and it does not provide em-
ployers with a valid defense of their actions. 133
D. The Strong-Basis-In-Evidence Standard
In another discrimination case, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, the Court applied the strong-basis-in-evidence stan-
dard. 34 In Wygant, non-minority schoolteachers filed suit against
their school board. 35 The teachers alleged that a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement conferred special protection for
minority teachers in the event of a layoff. 136 The issue the Court
had to resolve was whether a school board can extend protection
against layoffs on the basis of race.' 37 The Court reasoned that
before an employer or governmental entity engages in certain ac-
tions on the basis of race, there must be convincing evidence of
prior discrimination to justify that action. 38
Justice Powell emphasized the necessity of a strong-basis-in-
evidence standard when an employer takes an action on the basis
of race and non-minority employees challenge that action in
court. 39 The strong-basis-in-evidence standard is a higher stan-
131. Id. at 454.
132. Id. The Court asserted that "a nondiscriminatory 'bottom-line' and an employer's
good-faith efforts to achieve a nondiscriminatory work force, might in some cases assist an
employer in rebutting the inference that particular action had been intentionally discrimi-
natory." Id.
133. Id.
134. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
135. Id. at 271.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 269-70.
138. Id. at 277. Justice Kennedy, in the Ricci decision, asserted: "In announcing the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard, the Wygant plurality recognized the tension between
eliminating segregation and discrimination on the one band and doing away with all go-
vernmentally imposed discrimination based on race on the other." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662.
139. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. Justice Powell reasoned:
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted becomes
crucial when the remedial program is challenged in court by nonminority employees.
In this case, for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial program-
Article XII-had the purpose and effect of instituting a racial classification that was
not justified by a remedial purpose. In such a case, the trial court must make a fac-
tual determination that the employer had a strong -basis- in -evidence for its conclu-
sion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the em-
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dard than that of prima facie.140 Accordingly, the strong-basis-in-
evidence standard requires convincing evidence and more than
just a mathematical basis of discrimination. 141 The Court held
that the school board did not sufficiently justify their actions in
accordance with the strong-basis-in-evidence standard in deter-
mining lay-offs on the basis of race and, therefore, their policy of
providing protection to minority teachers against the layoffs was
unlawful. 42
Another case which applied the strong-basis-in-evidence stan-
dard to an issue of discriminatory actions taken by an employer or
government entity was City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Co. 143
Like the decision in Wygant, the Court in Crosson had to deter-
mine a discriminatory issue pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 144 In this case, the City of
Richmond enacted a Business Utilization Plan that required gen-
eral contractors, who were hired by the city, to employ a certain
amount of minority subcontractors. 4 5 There was no prior evi-
dence that contractors had discriminated against minority subcon-
tractors, nor that Richmond itself had engaged in discriminatory
practices.146 However, the evidence that was introduced to justify
the Business Utilization Plan was a statistical study, which ana-
lyzed Richmond's minority construction contracts as applied to the
general population of minorities in Richmond. 147
The issue before the Court was whether Richmond had demon-
strated a strong-basis-in-evidence of prior discrimination in the
construction business, sufficient to justify its actions on the basis
of race.' 48 The Court reasoned that a general statement indicating
that there has been past discrimination did not justify Richmond's
ployees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative -action program. But
unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by
nonminority employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based
action is justified as a remedy for prior discrimination.
Id. at 277-78 (internal citation omitted).
140. See Petitioners' Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 34.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 283-84.
143. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
144. Crosson, 488 U.S. at 476-77.
145. Id. at 477-78.
146. Id. at 480.
147. Id. at 479-80. The statistic introduced was "a statistical study indicating that,
although the city's population was 50% black, only 0.67% of its prime construction contracts
had been awarded to minority businesses in recent years; figures establishing that a varie-
ty of local contractors' associations had virtually no MBE [minority] members ... "Id.
148. Id. at 500.
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actions of passing legislation on the basis of race. 14 9 Therefore, the
Court held that Richmond had failed to demonstrate a strong-
basis-in-evidence that would justify their decision that was pre-
mised upon the basis of race. 1 50
It should be noted that the Court in Wygant and J.A. Crosson
Co. applied the strong-basis-in-evidence standard. It was not un-
til the Ricci decision that the Court established that in cases in-
volving disparate -impact liability pursuant to Title VII, employers
have to demonstrate justification and business necessity at a
higher standard-the strong-basis-in- evidence standard.
In 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
amended Title VII thereby codifying the concepts that the Court
established in Griggs pertaining to disparate -impact liability.15 1
These concepts include "business necessity" and "job related" as
applied to the disparate -impact provisions of Title VII. 152 Moreo-
ver, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added Section 106, which per-
tains to the "Prohibition Against Discriminatory Use of Test
Scores." 153
V. THE JUDICIAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF Ricci
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United
States has made tremendous advancements pertaining to racial
equality-judicially, socially, and politically. 1 5 4  Unfortunately,
advancements in the area of equal employment have not been rea-
lized without a feeling of apprehension from workers who believe
they have been disadvantaged because they are a non-minority.
The Ricci case demonstrated this precise feeling as perceived by
the firefighters of New Haven, Connecticut. 15 5 Moreover, the judi-
149. Crosson, 488 U.S. at 500. "None of these 'findings,' singly or together, provide the city
of Richmond with a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary.' There is nothing approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory
violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry." Id (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S, at
277 (plurality opinion)).
150. Id.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
152. Id.
153. Id. The new subsection that the provisions of 1991 added is:
(1) It shall be unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the
selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to ad-
just the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, em-
ployment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1).
154. Lauren Klein, Ricci v. Destefano: "Fanning the Flames" or Reverse Discrimination
inl Civil Service Selection, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 391 (2009).
155. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2658.
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cial, social, and political implications surrounding the Ricci deci-
sion involve an interesting development of race relations in the
United States.
A. The Jludicial Implications of Ricci
In terms of judicial implications, from the district court level to
the appellate level, and on to the Supreme Court level, the court's
rationale evolved in an interesting way. With the Ricci decision,
the Supreme Court's narrow majority established a new precedent
by articulating a new strong-basis-of-evidence standard in deter-
mining cases pursuant to Title VII's disparate impact provi-
sions.156 Notwithstanding the fact that the Court established a
new standard, it is not surprising that the Court applied a strict
scrutiny approach given previous decisions. The strong-basis-in-
evidence standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education and City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Crosson Co.
The decisions of the district court and court of appeals regarding
this case found in favor of the respondents by applying a different
standard than the standard established at the Supreme Court lev-
el. The district court applied the test established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,157 due to Ricci's allegations of intentional
discrimination. 15 8 The McDonnell Douglas test consists of four
factors that establish a prima facie case of discrimination: (1)
membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the position;
(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances giving
rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of membership
in a protected class. 159 The district court found that Ricci satisfied
all of these requirements. 16 0
After the prima facie case was established, New Haven had to
provide evidence to prove that the reasoning behind their alleged
discriminatory actions were in fact justified in a nondiscriminato-
ry manner. 161 At this point, New Haven raised the justification
that, in discarding the test results, they were attempting to comp-
ly with Title VII's disparate -impact provisions. The district court
held that New Haven was justified in refusing to certify the re-
156. Id. at 2664.
157. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
158. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F.Supp.2d 142,151-52 (D. Conn. 2006).
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suits. 162 To this, Ricci argued that the justification given by New
Haven was prohibited under the same provisions of the Civil
Rights Act that New Haven used to justify their actions-Title
VII. The district court responded to Ricci's argument by citing the
holdings in Hayden v. County of Nassau163 and Kirkland v. N.Y
State Dep't of Correctional Services.'64 These cases established
that, under Title VII, employers are allowed to voluntarily comply
and react to disparate -results by utilizing "race-normed adjust-
ments" that would increase the number of minorities on staff. 165
Therefore, the district court in Ricci determined that an employ-
er's intention to voluntarily comply with Title VII's disparate-
impact provisions are not the same as discriminating against non-
minority job candidates. 66
B. The Social Implications of Ricci
In terms of social implications, because the Supreme Court in
Ricci reversed the district court and the Second Circuit's decision
and established a new standard, in effect, the Ricci decision will
likely make it very difficult to voluntarily comply with Title VII.
If an employer's business practice has a disparate effect on minor-
ities it is going to be difficult for employers to correct this impact
because of the heightened strong-basis-in-evidence standard.
Therefore, employers must change the way they react when test
results reveal a racial disparity. This is not necessarily a bad
thing; this could essentially make the employer more mindful of
its potential course of action when held to a higher standard dur-
ing litigation.
The strong-basis-in-evidence has the potential to act as a deter-
rent against employers from making quick and insufficiently
planned decisions, potentially unduly influenced by many differ-
ent factors. This deterrent would, in effect, protect against similar
allegations that were asserted in Ricci, including that the City of
New Haven had been unduly influenced by an outspoken political
leader, who lobbied the Board to discard the test results. 167 Es-
sentially, the Court's establishment of the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard will not likely have an effect, either good or bad, on em-
162. Id.
163. 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).
164. 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983).
165. Ricci, 554 F.Supp.2d at 157.
166. Id.
167. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684-85.
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ployer's reactions to disparate results. Now that the nation's
highest court has made a determination about the level at which
evidence must be analyzed under TIitle VII, the only way that this
precedent can be overturned is with another Supreme Court case
addressing this same issue or by legislation enacted by Congress.
The Court has ruled in accordance with already established
precedent. The Court in Wygant asserted that "[rlacial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and . . . call for the
most exacting judicial examination. 168 When there is a question
of racial discrimination of any kind, the Court ought to apply strict
scrutiny. Although the dissent's argument regarding the difficulty
or near impossibility of an employer's voluntary compliance with
Title VII are compelling, they are not justified. It is understanda-
ble and important for employers to feel that they should be able to
voluntarily comply with Title VII when the threat of disparate
impact liability arises. But when there is an allegation of a viola-
tion of Congressionally passed legislation, which, as in this case, is
essential to the notion of Equal Protection, employers should bear
the heavy burden of being strictly scrutinized. Employers should
be held accountable for the actions they take regarding how em-
ployment decisions are made, especially when those decisions
have racial implications.
C. The Political Implications of Ricci
The Ricci case also received special attention due to its political
implications, specifically, the Supreme Court's reversal of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which was written by
President Obama's new appointment to the high court, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor. Although Justice Sotomayor and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals basically issued a one-paragraph per cu-
riam'69 opinion adopting the reasoning of the district court, the
political and legal effects were nonetheless apparent. 170 Since the
Ricci decision was handed down almost a month to the day prior
to Justice Sotomayor's confirmation, many political and legal ana-
lysts speculated at the possibility of this decision being a hurdle in
168. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
169. A per curicim opinion is "[a] opinion handed down by an appellate court without
identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." BLAcC's LAw DICTI~ONARYv 1201
(9th ed. 2009).
170. Ricci, 129 S. ct.at 2672.
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the newly selected Justice's appointment process. 171 With the ex-
ception of several allegations by members of Conservative
groups,172 the Senate Judiciary Committee proceedings came and
went with minimal mention of the Ricci decision and Justice So-
tomayor was confirmed to the Supreme Court on July 28, 2009.173
It is interesting that in Justice Sotomayor's confirmation
process that many had speculated at the potential for controversy
surrounding her decision, and more importantly, the reversal of
the Second Circuit's opinion in Ricci. Understandably, on the sur-
face, it does 'look bad' for a higher Court to reverse the decision of
a lower court. However, the Second Circuit and Justice Sotomayor
issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion that adopted the rea-
soning of the district court. 174 Additionally, in the Ricci decision,
the opinion of the Second Circuit and Justice Sotomayor was re-
versed because the Supreme Court set a new precedent by estab-
lishing a strong-basis-in-evidence standard as applied to dispa-
rate-impact provisions of Title VII. Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit and Justice Sotomayor did not necessarily apply the facts of
Ricci incorrectly or inconsistently with already established
precedent and/or law. Rather, the Second Circuit did not apply
the strict scrutiny that the Supreme Court went on to apply. In-
stead the court ruled consistently with Second Circuit jurispru-
dence by concluding that New Haven satisfied their burden of
proof. That burden of proof was a "good faith belief' that there
171. The Wall Street Journal released an article on May 29, 2009 which stated that
"[tihe ruling [Ricci v. DeStefano] is now turning into perhaps the most contentious of the
4,000 Judge Sotomayor made in 17 years on the federal bench, and it is likely to come up in
her Supreme Court confirmation hearings." Suzanne Sataline et al., A Sotomayor Ruling
Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at A-3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124354041637563491.html. See also Rachel Martin,
POLITICS: Ricci v. DeStefano ruling to impact Sotomayor's fate?, June 28, 2009,
http://www.necn.com/Boston/ PoliticsI2009/06/28[Ricci-v-DeStefano-ruling-
to/1246220543.html ("This week the Supreme Court will offer a ruling on a case that was
controversial long before the nation ever heard of Supreme Court nominee Sonia Soto-
mayor, but now it has become a flashpoint for critics as the judge faces upcoming Senate
confirmation hearings.")
172. Martin, supra, note 148. An example of an allegation made hy a conservative group
regarding Justice Sotomayor included: "Citing a 2001 speech as an example, conservatives
say Sotomayor allows personal feelings to impact her rulings. At the time, she said that a
Latina woman would 'more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who
hasn't lived that life."' Id.
173. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Sotomayor Confirmed by Senate Judiciary Committee,
HUFFINGTON POST, July 28, 2009, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/28/sotomayor-confirmed-by-se n_246262.html.
174. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672. See Ricci v. Stefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2008).
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existed a disparate impact, thereby justifying New Haven's deci-
sion to throw out the exams. 175
D. A Far Reaching Decision
The judicial, social, and political implications surrounding this
case all set the stage for many interesting questions about the fu-
ture of race relations. Judicially speaking, a new precedent in an
evidentiary standard pursuant to Title VII's disparate -impact was
established by the Court. Additionally, in terms of social implica-
tions, this case involved the changing of a standard that will affect
the actions of employers when they encounter disparate -results in
the workplace by limiting their ways of voluntarily complying with
Title VII. Finally, the political implications surrounding the Ricci
decision involved the United States' first African-American presi-
dent's first Supreme Court nomination, who is the first Hispanic
and third woman in history to ever sit on the bench of the highest
Court in the United States. 76 All of the racial implications sur-
rounding the Ricci case have further sparked the ongoing conver-
sation of race relations in the United States of America, potential-
ly making this case the focal point for future discussions of affir-
mative action.
Katlin L. Connelly
175. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
176. Davis, supra, note 173.
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